Turkish Imports of Strategic Products from Israel: Strategic Bonds amongst Turbulent Relations

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Abstract

During the last two decades, Turkish-Israeli relations were downgraded from a strategic importance status to an almost hostile one. At the same time, the trade between these two countries has not been affected at all by this negative development. Even though this paradox has already been noticed in the relevant literature, scholarly works have not yet focused on the study of the strategic trade between these two countries in order to examine deeper this contradictory trade-foreign relations interaction. Taking into account that the bilateral relations reached a bottom level only after a political change in Turkey in 2002, the present paper focuses on the strategic products that Turkey imported from Israel. Therefore, the paper addresses the question whether the latter turbulent Turkish-Israeli relations have affected the Turkish imports of strategic products from Israel. To this research question, the paper hypothesizes that the unfavorable climate of the bilateral relations had a quite negative impact on the imports of such products from Israel. Thus, the aim of the paper is to study these imports of strategic products in terms of size and magnitude in order to explore their role in the overall imports of Turkey from Israel and the bilateral relations of these two countries, as well. To achieve this aim, the paper analyzes the quantitative data of Turkish imports from Israel concerning a number of strategic products, from 1995 to 2019, employing descriptive and correlation statistics. The research results reveal that strategic products constitute the main content of the imports of Turkey from Israel, while their trading took place mainly during the years when the bilateral relations had been severely deteriorated. Therefore, the role of strategic products is proved fundamental for the trade and foreign relations between Turkey and Israel.

1. Introduction

The relations of Turkey with Israel have been downgraded rapidly to a very low level over the past two decades. Yet, this negative development took place right after a period during which the bilateral relations had reached a level of strategic importance. More specifically, since the 1950s, the relations of Turkey and Israel have been more or less benign. What is more, in the late 1990s, the bilateral relations were advanced to a level of strategic

importance. However, since 2002, when in Turkey the moderate Islamist Justice and Development Party (JDP) came in power, the bilateral relations were reduced to an almost hostile situation. At the same time, the trade between these two countries has not been affected at all by this deterioration in relations, but conversely, their bilateral trade is continually growing until today.

Even though this paradox has already been noticed in the relevant literature, scholarly works have not yet focused on the study of the strategic trade in order to examine deeper this contradictory trade-foreign relations interaction. Taking into account that the bilateral relations reached a bottom level only after a political change in Turkey in 2002, the present paper focuses on the strategic products that Turkey imported from Israel. Therefore, the paper addresses the question whether the latter turbulent Turkish-Israeli relations have affected the Turkish imports of strategic products from Israel. To this research question, the paper hypothesizes that the unfavorable climate of the bilateral relations had a quite negative impact on the imports of such products from Israel.

Thus, the aim of the paper is to study these imports of strategic products in terms of size and magnitude in order to explore their role in the overall imports of Turkey from Israel and the bilateral relations of these two countries, as well. The study concerns a period of twenty-five years, from 1995 to 2019, which covers both the strategic and bottom-level years of relations of Turkey with Israel. In order to achieve this aim, the paper analyzes the quantitative data of Turkish imports from Israel, from 1995 to 2019, focusing on a number of nine strategic products, employing descriptive and correlation statistics. The research results from this study allows the paper to shed light on the role of strategic products in the imports of Turkey from Israel, as well as, on the contradiction of the trade and foreign relations between Turkey and Israel.

The next section reviews the most relevant literature in the area of strategic trade and foreign relations. In particular, in this section the paper attempts to define the term 'strategic product' and discusses the role of strategic products in trade and foreign relations of states. The third section stresses the attitude of Turkey towards Israel through a concise review of the foreign and trade relations of Turkey with Israel. The fourth section develops the methodology by which the paper conducted the data analysis, while the fifth section presents the results of this analysis. The sixth section discusses the research results relating them to the broader literature of the field and finally, comes up with remarkable inferences. The last section is the conclusion of the paper and mentions the main points and inferences of the whole research and discusses intriguing topics for further research.

2. Strategic Products and their Role in Trade and Foreign Relations of States

As the introduction above has determined, the paper aims to study the Turkish imports of strategic products from Israel in order to explore their role in the overall imports of Turkey from Israel and the bilateral relations of Turkey and Israel, as well. Therefore, in this section the paper reviews the most relevant scholarly works in the area of strategic trade and foreign relations. Initially, the review identifies several attempts to define the term 'strategic product'. Thereafter, the review discusses the role of strategic products in trade and foreign relations of states, as well as, the interaction of foreign relations and international trade.

The review concludes with useful inferences which contribute to the research methodology developed below.

Regarding the concept of 'strategic product', the discussion has not yet concluded to a universal definition, so that the features which could characterize a product as strategic be clarified. This concept varies to a large extend among international and governmental organizations, as well as, among scholars. Nevertheless, most efforts to come up with a definition share the view that strategic products are critical of military use. Undoubtedly, military equipment such as munitions, weapons and other defense systems are reasonably considered as strategic since they are critical in the conduction of military operations (Nelson 2020; Sherzer & Yesner, 1984). However, they are not the only ones which can be considered as such. The narrow notion of strategic products referring only to military equipment has been broadened, though, by the works of Knorr (1973), Førland (1991), and Reuveny and Kang (1998). In particular, they have introduced the notion of potential impact products can have on the military power of states. In this regard, the feature of impact itself broadens the sort of products that can be considered as strategic, as such an impact can be caused also by dual-use products.

Indeed, dual-use products, for instance chemicals and metals, can contribute to the production and development of military equipment and consequently, they should also be considered as strategic. However, such products can also be used for non-military purposes. As a result, the impact of strategic products does not have to be exclusively, or at least directly, on the military power of states. In this respect, Knorr (1973) had broadened the notion of impact of strategic products and added an economic dimension in this impact feature. In particular, he stated that strategic products have an impact on the economic basis of a country which, in turn, affects the industrial production of military commodities and thus, its military strength. However, an economic advancement provided by such products is essentially related with the geopolitical power of a state. Therefore, dual-use products, for example, fuels, chemicals, metals, machines and scientific equipment (Reuveny & Kang; 1998) can be characterized as strategic, since they can contribute to the industrial and technological advancement of states and ultimately, to their economic development. Consequently, such products can have a positive effect on the geopolitical role of states in their regional, or even, international environment.

In this respect, strategic products play a prominent role in the foreign relations of states, in their respective foreign policies and subsequently, in international trade. Particularly, such products are very important for maintaining balances in the world with respect to the preservation of international security and peace. As a result, the trade of strategic products is subject to control regime and eventually, this can affect the evolution of the foreign relations of states; for instance, to strengthen or weaken the political and economic ties among states. However, states, acting individually or through international organizations, influence this control regime according to their foreign policy concerns; that is, they monitor the trading of strategic products and regulate their exports and imports accordingly (Nelson, 2020; Colussi, 2015; Sherzer & Yesner, 1984).

Therefore, the foreign policy of a state plays a very crucial role on the international trade of such products and as many scholars contend, trade policy is in essence interwoven with foreign policy (Flores-Macías & Kreps, 2013; Cooper, 1972b). In fact, there are works which have studied the utilization of trade by the foreign policies of powerful states in order to control less powerful states and found significant evidence of influence (Aremu, 2009; Moon, 1985, 1983; Richardson & Kegley, 1980). However, such trade enhancing practices

in favor of foreign relations and foreign policy objectives have been hitherto linked with a diminishing of conflicts in the world.

Indeed, according to the liberal argument, as international trade increases, the possibility of conflict among states is reduced and the way for improvement of foreign relations and cooperation among states is paved (Polachek, 2007, 1980; Heginbotham & Samuels, 1998; Cooper, 1972a). Furthermore, as Pollins (1989) has studied the data of a network of twenty-five countries, trade flows are significantly influenced according to the nature of the foreign relations, that is, if they are friendly or not. Nonetheless, this negative trade-conflict relationship does not seem to hold true in every case. More specifically, Su et al. (2020) studying the Sino-US relations and Pantsios (2007) studying the Greek-Turkish relations found that trade does not always reduce conflict or conversely, conflict does not always reduce trade. In similar cases, Reuveny and Kang (1998) studying the data of sixteen cases of pair countries found that even if trade has not been affected by the nature of foreign relations, the trade flows of strategic products, however, are ultimately influenced. Simply put it, strategic trade flows are generally influenced by the nature of foreign relations.

To sum up, as it emerges from the literature discussed above, products which could be characterized as strategic need to possess the ability to have an impact on the geopolitical role of states. That is, strategic products should potentially contribute to the industrial, technological and military advancement of states. Therefore, such products could be, for example, energy products (e.g. petroleum, gas etc.), raw materials (e.g. iron, steel and other construction materials), chemicals, machines, scientific equipment (e.g. electronics, computers, etc.) etc., as well as, military equipment and various defense systems. Therefore, such products have a prominent place in the making and implementation of foreign policy decisions and subsequently, through the control of their trading, in international trade. Inevitably, the trading of strategic products has the potential to affect the evolution of the foreign relations of states–that is, either to contribute to the establishment of strong ties between states or to dissolve them–depending always on the particular foreign policy concerns of states. Consequently, the trade flows of strategic products are influenced by the nature of foreign relations; however, the opposite does not necessarily hold true.

Such discontinuities of the trade-foreign relations interaction led scholars to call for further exploration of its aspects. In particular, they have stressed the need of research to focus on the causal mechanisms of this relationship and to study its performance across different trading groups of products with varying strategic importance (Pantsios 2007; Mansfield & Pollins, 2001). The present paper catches the thread of the state of the art from this point of research and studies the trade flows of strategic products that Turkey imported from Israel in order to further explore this trade-foreign relations interaction. Prior to the research methodology, however, the next section presents first a background of the foreign and trade relations of Turkey with Israel, so as the paper to portray the attitude of Turkey towards Israel.

3. The Relations of Turkey with Israel: Foreign Policy and Trade

As it has been mentioned in the introduction of the paper, this section offers a brief review of the Turkish-Israeli relations in order to stress the attitude of Turkey towards Israel. To this end, the section focuses on the foreign policy and trade of Turkey with Israel. In

general, the relations between Turkey and Israel since the 1950s have been more or less benign while, during the 1990s, they were advanced to a strategic level. However, during the last two decades, the bilateral relations were downgraded to an almost hostile level. At the same time, the trade between Turkey and Israel not only has not been affected at all, but conversely, it was increased dramatically.

More specifically, the dispute between Arabs and Israelis and particularly, the Palestinian issue, has been the most influential factor in the making of Turkey's foreign policy towards Israel. After the establishment of Israel as a state and during the cold war years, Turkey was maintaining a policy of equal distances towards both Arabs and Israelis. According to this policy, any Turkish support to the Arab world was realized strictly through the framework of the United Nations aid. Thus, until the end of the cold war, Turkey was avoiding to give any impression that it puts efforts to approach Israel in order to improve relations, as such an action would place Turkey in an inconvenient position towards the Arab countries (Kirisçi, 2004; Aras, 2002; Özcan, 1998/2001; Sayari, 1997).

The post-cold war environment provided Turkey with unprecedented opportunities regarding its foreign policy choices. Specifically, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Gulf War left more than enough space for Turkey to create a strategic depth for its foreign policy and thus, to play a more significant and active role in the greater Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean region. Consequently, Israel was perceived as a key partner in the making of Turkish foreign policy and as a result, the policy of 'equal distances' was replaced by a new one which allowed for a wider cooperation with Israel in various important sectors. For example, the cooperation of Turkey with Israel was developed mainly in strategic sectors such as the defense technologies, the conduct of common military exercises and training, the exchange of intelligence, etc. Therefore, during the 1990s, the relations of Turkey with Israel were advanced to a strategic level due to respective military and economic agreements that were signed (Uzer, 2013; Balcı & Kardaş 2012, Inbar 2001, Sayari 2000).

However, this climate of advanced strategic relations was altered when a new political party in Turkey came in power, in 2002. The Justice and Development Party (JDP)[2] had a moderate islamist political orientation and implemented a foreign policy agenda that was compatible with its own political values. As a result, Turkey under JDP pursued closer relations not only with the arab countries, but also with the muslim countries, more broadly. The aim of this policy was to extend its foreign policy strategic depth of the 1990s to a global scale and to achieve a leading role in the muslim world, as well. Consequently, on the Palestinian issue Turkey supported clearly the Palestinians. As a result, this stance of Turkey created many frictions in its relations with Israel (Cohen & Freilich, 2014; Özkeçeci-Taner, 2012; Aytürk, 2011; Larabee, 2010, pp.43-45; Öniş, 2010).

For example, Turkey's approach with Hamas since 2006, Turkey's condemnation of Israel's military operation Cast Lead in 2008 in the Gaza Strip, the Mavi Marmara incident in 2010, the alleged Turkish involvement of Israeli agents' exposure in 2013, as well as, numerous provocative statements from both sides during this period harmed considerably the bilateral relations (Huber & Tocci, 2013; Samaan, 2013). Even though an agreement was signed in 2016 concerning the normalization of the bilateral relations, the climate between Turkey and Israel remained cold due to a US recognition of Jerusalem as the Israeli capital, right the next year. This unfavorable climate of relations has remained unchanged until today (Bellut & Köylü, 2021; Valori, 2021; Valansi, 2021).

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[2] The acronym JDP is originally AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) in Turkish.

Among the above frictions, the most traumatic was the incident of Mavi Marmara in 2010. Specifically, Mavi Marmara was a Turkish ship, part of an international flotilla transferring humanitarian aid to Gaza and aiming to break through the blockade status under which Gaza Strip was since 2007. When still in international waters, Israeli naval commandos boarded on the ship where they were confronted with board members of Mavi Marmara with bloody consequences; nine Turks were killed while many others were wounded, including a number of Israeli soldiers. As a result, this incident led to a major crisis in the bilateral relations which reached instantly to an absolute bottom (Huber & Tocci, 2013; Samaan, 2013; Huber, 2012; Palmer et al., 2011; UNHRC, 2010).[3]

Due to all these negative developments, military and economic agreements that had been signed during the 1990s were suspended and therefore, trade relations were expected to be deteriorated; especially, after the Mavi Marmara incident (Çağaptay and Evans 2012, p. 3). On the contrary, during these last two decades the trade between these two countries has not been affected at all, even though the relations of Turkey with Israel were downgraded to an almost hostile level. Indeed, bilateral trade between Turkey and Israel has continued to grow and moreover, at a much faster pace than it had been during the 1990s. (Eroğlu et al., 2016; Cohen & Freilich, 2014; Çağaptay & Evans, 2012).

In order to study the data of the bilateral trade over the 25 years study period, three separate periods can be discerned from the review of the bilateral relations above. The first concerns the years before in Turkey JDP comes to power, from 1995 to 2002. The second and third period concern the years when JDP is already in power. Specifically, the second period concerns the years before the Mavi Marmara incident, from 2003 to 2010, while the third period concerns the years after the Mavi Marmara incident, from 2011 to 2019. This time frame is followed also for the study of the strategic imports of Turkey from Israel, below.

Specifically, the trade between Turkey and Israel from 1995 to 2019 reached more than 75 billion dollars overall (see ***Table A.1*** in the appendix). As it appears in ***Figure 1*** below, close to the 2/3 of the overall trade between Turkey and Israel (almost 47 billion dollars) has taken place during the last nine years of the study period–that is, after the Mavi Marmara incident–while the 90% of the overall trade (more than 67 billion dollars) has taken place from 2002 to 2019–that is, since JDP came in power in Turkey. In the light of these data, it would not be an exaggeration to infer that the trade between Turkey and Israel has taken place since in Turkey the moderate Islamist JDP came in power.

It is clear that during the JDP years bilateral trade presented dramatically increasing trends, even though Turkey maintained a hard line in its foreign policy towards Israel. Even though scholars have noticed this contradiction in the Turkish-Israeli case, they have not yet focused on the study of the trade flows of strategic products. The next section develops the methodology that is followed in order the paper to examine deeper this contradictory trade-foreign relations interaction and finally, to answer the research question.

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[3] The Mavi Marmara incident was a major turning point in the bilateral relations causing a decisive downturn of the diplomatic and military relations. Specifically, Ankara right after recalled its ambassador from Tel Aviv while the following year expelled Israel's ambassador from Turkey. In turn, Israel interpreted this behaviour as a strategic move of Turkey aiming to manipulate its public opinion in front of the upcoming general elections in 2011, on the one hand and to accumulate Arab support that would allow Turkey to exercise soft power in the region at the expense of Israel, on the other (Huber & Tocci, 2013; Huber, 2012).

Figure 1. Total trade between Turkey and Israel, 1995-2019[4]

Source: Authors' own research (data gathered from OEC database).

4. Methodology

Following the presentation of the foreign and trade relations of Turkey with Israel, this section describes the methodology by which the paper answers the research question. As it has been mentioned in the introduction, the research question of the paper concerns on whether the latter turbulent Turkish-Israeli relations have affected the Turkish imports of strategic products from Israel. According to the literature reviewed earlier, trade flows of strategic products are generally affected by the nature of the foreign relations, even if the overall trade has not. Therefore, the paper hypothesizes that the unfavorable climate of the bilateral relations had a quite negative impact on the imports of such products from Israel. More specifically, taking advantage of this literature, the paper argues that, conversely to the overall Turkish imports from Israel, the imports of strategic products remained closely linked with the nature of the bilateral relations and therefore, they had been quite sensitive to their negative evolution.

In this context, strategic products are considered to have a geopolitical dimension of impact which is inevitably related with the foreign relations of states. More specifically, taking into account the efforts to define the concept of strategic products expressed in the literature review above, the paper comes up here with a single definition of the term. In particular, the paper defines strategic products as commodities which have an impact on the geopolitical role of states. As a result, according to such a conception, in cases of troubled foreign relations, states would tend to diminish the trade of such products. This definition of strategic products is very close to Knorr's (1973) conception of strategic products, though, the military and the economic dimensions of impact of strategic products are framed here by the broader geopolitical dimension. According to this broad geopolitical definition, as strategic can be considered products which primarily can contribute to the industrial and technological advancement of states and ultimately, to their economic development, as such a development could lead to military advancement, as well.

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[4] This figure is based on the data of Table A.1 in the appendix.

Therefore, strategic products can be considered, for instance, energy products (e.g. petroleum, gas etc.), raw materials (e.g. iron, steel and other construction materials), chemicals, machines, scientific equipment (e.g. electronics, computers, etc.) as well as, military equipment and various defense systems.

In order to test the hypothesis and answer the research question, the paper studied the trade flows of strategic products that Turkey imported from Israel. Consequently, the paper collected and processed the quantitative data of nine strategic products, according to the definition of strategic products given above, as well as, the quantitative data of the overall imports of Turkey from Israel. The relevant quantitative data were gathered from the "Observatory of Economic Complexity" (OEC) database which overcomes the research needs in terms of abundance and reliability of data.[5] The data were gathered for a period of 25 years, from 1995 to 2019, which covers both the strategic and bottom level years of relations of Turkey with Israel, respectively.[6] The strategic products were selected by each product category of the overall Turkish imports from Israel. As many product categories did not concern strategic products at all, the paper focused only on relevant product categories. From each such category, the greatest in share strategic product was selected. Due to the fact that most of the products under study presented quite high shares in their respective product categories, in cases when this share was observed lower than 20%, then the second in share strategic product in the same product category was selected, too. Though, this only happened once.

The trade flows of these nine strategic products are measured in terms of size and magnitude. At first, the paper measured the size of each strategic product's trade flows for the 25 years period in order to highlight those years when the higher trade flows took place; that is, during the years of positive or negative relations. Then, the study did exactly the same for the total volume of these strategic products trade flows and compared them to the overall imports of Turkey from Israel. Finally, the paper measured the magnitude of these strategic products imports for the overall Turkish imports from Israel. As high or low magnitude is considered the degree in which the trade flows each of these nine strategic products are dependent on each other.

In particular, if the trade flows of these products are highly dependent on each other, then it means that they have a low magnitude for the total Turkish imports from Israel, as a sudden decrease of the import flows in one of these products would lead to the reduction of the import flows of the other strategic products, as well. Conversely, if the trade flows of these products are not dependent on each other, then it means that they have a high magnitude for the total Turkish imports from Israel, as a sudden decrease or suspension of the import flows in one of these products would not affect the import flows of the other strategic products. In short, a high dependency among strategic products suggests a low magnitude, while a low dependency suggests a high magnitude. The size and the magnitude of those trade flows indicate the importance of strategic products for the overall imports of Turkey from Israel.

Regarding the measurement of the size of the strategic products trade flows, the study employed descriptive statistics, while for the measurement of magnitude employed

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[5] The Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC) is a data distribution and data visualization platform regarding international economic and trade dynamics. For further information on OEC, see the work of Simoes and Hidalgo (2011).
[6] The strategic products, from which the data were collected, were been located following the HS92 dataset of product classification. For a list of the strategic products sample and their HS92 IDs, see Table A.3 in the appendix.

correlation statistics. As for the calculations of these measurements, SPSS was used as a computer-assisted software that ensured for the reliability of the research results.[7] The methodology, as described above, allows the study to explore the role of strategic products in the overall imports of Turkey from Israel, as well as, in the bilateral relations of these two countries and thus, to further investigate the trade-foreign relations interplay. The next section presents the research results from the analysis of the relevant data.

5. Strategic Products Turkey Imported from Israel: A Presentation of the Research Results

This section presents the results of the data analysis which was conducted according to the methodology described above. First are presented the overall imports of Turkey from Israel, as well as, the product categories which the nine strategic products were chosen from. Then, the behaviour of the trade flows of each of these nine strategic products is analyzed in order to detect whether the higher trade flows took place during the positive or negative years of relations. Subsequently, the study does the same for the total volume of these strategic products trade flows and compares them to the overall imports of Turkey from Israel. Finally, are presented the results of the correlation test which measured the magnitude of these strategic products imports for the overall Turkish imports from Israel.

Figure 2. Turkish imports from Israel, 1995-2019

Source: Authors' own research.

The overall imports of Turkey from Israel, as they are presented in *Figure 2* above, show a continuous increasing trend throughout the 25 years study period which gradually evolved to very high values. In more details, trade flows were continually increasing until 2007. Then, they increased quite rapidly and reached their highest values (e.g., 2011, 2013, 2014, 2015), exceeding in 2014 the amount of 2.8 billion dollars. In total, during this 25 years period, the imports of Turkey from Israel exceeded the amount of 28 billion dollars which accounts for a bit more than the 1/3 of the overall bilateral trade (37,5%), while the trade balance has always been positive for Turkey (see *Table A.1* in the appendix). In particular, 60% of the overall imports of Turkey from Israel (more than 17 billion dollars) have taken

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[7] For research design, quantitative methods and data analysis see Babbie (2011), Neuman (2006), Chambliss and Shutt (2003), and Miller and Salkind (2002).

place during the years after the Mavi Marmara incident, while almost 90% of the overall imports (more than 25 billion dollars) have taken place from 2002 to 2019. In simple words, the imports of Turkey from Israel have mainly taken place since in Turkey JDP came in power.

Figure 3. Product categories that Turkey imported from Israel, 1995-2019

Source: Authors' own research.

The next figure (***Figure 3***) presents the overall imports of Turkey from Israel for the same period by product categories. It is clear from this figure that product categories which concern mainly strategic products dominate the overall imports. More specifically, the first five product categories, that is minerals, chemicals, plastics, machines and metals account for an almost 85% of the total imports. The nine strategic products were selected from these product categories, as well as, from instruments, transportation and weapons categories. The rest product categories concern non-strategic products–that is mainly, textile, paper and food products–which account only for the 10% of the total imports (see ***Table A.3*** in the appendix) and therefore, they are not relevant to the purposes of the research. According to the methodology described above, the greatest in share strategic product was selected from each product category.[8] The nine strategic products which were selected from these product categories are refined petroleum, propylene polymers, cyclic hydrocarbons, scrap iron, gas turbines, electric generating sets, aircrafts,[9] lcds and weapons.[10] The behaviour of the trade flows of each of these nine products is presented in ***Table 1*** and is analyzed below

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[8] Regarding the Machines product category, the greatest product in share is gas turbines which is also a product of strategic interest; though, it accounts for a bit more than 15%, which is less than the 20% threshold set by the methodology of the paper above. Therefore, a second product of strategic interest was selected from the same category, that is, electric generating sets which accounts for almost 14% and is the second in share in this category.

[9] The Aircrafts product is consisted of two separate products, that of "Planes-Helicopters-Spacecrafts" (HS92 ID: 8802) and that of "Aircraft Parts" (HS92 ID: 8803). The analysis took account of both due to their high similarity.

[10] According to the literature review and the methodology above, all products contained into the weapons product categories, are considered strategic. Consequently, the whole category is accounted as a single product. In addition, the product "Tanks and other Armored fighting vehicles" (HS92 ID: 871000), which originally belongs to the Transportation product category, was also included in the weapons product.

in order to detect whether the higher trade flows took place during the positive or negative years of bilateral relations.

A closer look at the figures of **Table 1** reveals three types of patterns of trade flows behaviour; the continuous/gradual increase behaviour pattern, the two-sided behaviour pattern and the isolated explosions behaviour pattern.[11] The first type concerns the refined petroleum and the cyclic hydrocarbons. The trade flows behaviour of these products shows a continuously increasing trend which gradually evolves to very high values. In the case of the refined petroleum, for example, trade flows are continually increasing until 2010. From 2011 onwards, trade flows inreased rapidly and reached their highest values, exceeding in 2014 the amount of 1.8 billion dollars.[12] Similar is the case of cyclic hydrocarbons. Trade flows, despite a number of drops, show an increasing trend throughout the study period which reached more than 80 million dollars in 2004 and almost 170 millions in 2013. In both cases, the rapid increase of trade flows has taken palce during the years after the Mavi Marmara incident. This is pretty much the case for the two-sided behaviour pattern below.

The two-sided behaviour pattern concerns propylene polymers, scrap iron, electric generating sets and lcds. The trade flows behaviour of these four products presents a significant instant change after which the values of the trade flows are skyrocketed. As a reuslt, on the respective figures is created a two-sided image–bottom low line on the left, top high line on the right. More specifically, in all these four cases, while trade flows are very low or even absent in the beginning, suddenly, they increase tremendously and remain in high levels in all of the following years. This turning point is recorded in 2004 for the scrap iron, in 2007 for the propylene polymers and lcds and in 2011 for the electric generating sets. The highest values for these products are also recorded after these turning points; for instance, in 2008 propylene polymers reached 230 million dollars, in 2010 scrap iron reached 172 million dollars, in 2016 lcds reached 30 million dollars and in 2018 electric generating sets reached 90 million dollars. Both the turning points and the highest values have been recorded during the years after in Turkey JDP came in power.

The isolated explosions behaviour pattern concerns gas turbines, aircrafts and weapons. The trade flows behaviour of these three products presents isolated rapid increases while trade flows are generally at a very low level. This behaviour produces outlier values which are conviniently described here as "isolated explosions". Such outliers have been recorded from 1999 to 2002 and from 2009 to 2011, though the higher ones took place mainly during the latter years–that is, after JDP came in power. More specifically, in the case of gas turbines, a tremendous increase took place during 2000 and 2002 reaching more than 245 million dollars in 2001. In the case of the aircrafts, a tremendous increase took place in 2002 when it reached more than 72 million dollars and a second took place during 2010 and 2011. Its highest value for the overall period was recorded in 2010 when it reached almost 90 million dollars. In the case of weapons such explosions took place in 1999, 2002, 2009 and 2011, though its highest value has been recorded in 2009 when it reached almost 60 million dollars.

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[11] These three labels of the trade flows behaviour patterns were invented by the authors of this paper for the convenience of the results description.

[12] Even though the values until 2010 are depicted in the respective figure in Table 1 as very low, in fact they correspond to significant amounts of money which range from less than 10 million to over 300 million dollars. The large size of these values is due to the fact that, over the 25 years period of study, refined petroleum accounts for almost 30% of the total Turkish imports from Israel having exceeded the amount of 8 billion dollars, overall.

Table 1. Strategic products that Turkey imported from Israel, 1995-2019


Source: Authors' own research.

The trade flows of the nine strategic products above clearly presented significant change during the years after in Turkey JDP came in power and while the relations between Turkey and Israel had reached a bottom level. More specifically, while in the first years of the study period trade flows were in low levels or presented a slow increasing trend, in the following years, when in Turkey JDP was in power, they presented a tremendous rapid increase. Furthermore, the highest values of these products were recorded during those years of turbulent relations (with the only exception, though, that of gas turbines). The evolution of the trade flows of these nine strategic products is depicted more clearly in *Figure 4* below. In this figure the trade flows of the nine strategic products are placed in contrast to the overall imports of Turkey from Israel. More specifically, the light blue area represents the overall imports of Turkey from Israel while the deep blue area represents the total volume of the trade flows of the nine strategic products.

In particular, the total trade flows of the nine strategic products presented a continuous increasing trend which gradually evolved to very high values. As this figure makes clear, the evolution of the trade flows of both the strategic products and the overall imports follow a similar trajectory. Indicatively, the highest value of both the strategic products and the overall imports was recorded in 2014 when they reached almost 2.2 billion dollars and more than 2.9 billion dollars, respectively. In addition, the trade flows of these just nine strategic products analyzed above account for more than the half of the overall imports of Turkey from Israel. More specifically, the total imports of the nine strategic products reached almost 15 billion dollars–that is, 53% of the overall imports of Turkey from Israel. Especially, more than 90% of these total strategic imports has taken place during the years JDP was in power. Moreover, almost 70% of these imports has taken place during the years after the Mavi Marmara incident (see *Table A.4* in the appendix).

Figure 4. Strategic products that Turkey imported from Israel, 1995-2019

Source: Authors' own research.

Table 2. Correlation among the strategic products Turkey imported from Israel, 1995-2019

	Propylene Polymers	Cyclic Hydrocarbons	Scrap Iron	Electric Generating Sets	Aircrafts	LCDs
Refined Petroleum	.525	.548		.756		.659
Propylene Polymers		.597	.761			.660
Cyclic Hydrocarbons			.587	.583		.516
Scrap Iron					.494	.485

Source: Authors' own research.

Having measured the trade flows of these nine strategic products in terms of size, as the methodology above has pointed out, these flows depicted in the deep blue area in *Figure 4* need to be measured now in terms of magnitude. A Pearson correlation was conducted in order to measure the magnitude of these strategic products imports for the overall Turkish imports from Israel. According to the methodology, as high or low magnitude is considered the degree in which the trade flows each of these nine strategic products are dependent on each other. Thus, a high correlation between the trade flows of these strategic products suggests a high dependency among strategic products which implies a low magnitude of the strategic products trade for the overall imports of Turkey from Israel. Conversely, a low correlation between the trade flows of these strategic products suggests a low dependency among strategic products which implies a high magnitude of the strategic products trade for the overall imports of Turkey from Israel.

The results of the correlation test are presented in *Table A.5* in the appendix.[13] In all 36 cases only 12 present a high significance and which are presented in *Table 2*. However, all of them present very low correlations.[14] As a result, the trade each of the nine strategic products does not depend on that of any of the other strategic products. Therefore, it can be inferred that the imports of strategic products possess a high magnitude for the overall imports of Turkey from Israel. Taking all the above analysis into account, both the size and the magnitude of those trade flows measured above indicate that the importance of strategic products for the overall imports of Turkey from Israel is quite high. In short, the imports of Turkey from Israel, which, as noted earlier, equal for the 1/3 of the total volume of the bilateral trade, concerns mainly and are dependent on strategic products. The research results presented in this section allow the study to explore the role of strategic products in the foreign and trade relations of Turkey with Israel and thus, to examine deeper the paradox in their contradictory evolution. The next section discusses the above research results.

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[13] For the conduct of the correlation test, the Z-scores of the variables were taken into account.

[14] The threshold for a high correlation is considered over 0,8 in order to check for import flows of strategic products which only have a significant effect on each other.

6. Strategic Bonds amongst Turbulent Relations: A Discussion of The Research Results

This section discusses the results from the data analysis above, lays these results into the broader literature and comes up with remarkable inferences. As the data analysis brought up, during this 25 years period, the imports of strategic products were increased dramatically. This tremendous increase took place during the years when the bilateral relations had reached a bottom level. That is, the Turkish imports of strategic products from Israel have not been affected at all by the turbulent Turkish-Israeli relations. According to the literature review discussed earlier in this paper, the nature of the foreign relations of states generally affects bilateral trade and more specifically, the trade of strategic products. However, these results are contrary to what the literature has asserted hitherto regarding the negative relationship between the nature of the foreign relations and the flows of strategic trade. Therefore, the hypothesis that the unfavorable climate of the bilateral relations would have a quite negative impact on the imports of strategic products from Israel is not confirmed.

Another significant finding of the above analysis was that the imports of Turkey from Israel over the 25 years study period concerned mainly strategic products. In particular, the strategic products that Turkey imported from Israel accounted in fact for the largest share of the overall Turkish imports from Israel. The trade flows of the nine strategic products that were studied above accounted for more than the half (53%) of the total imports. Taking into consideration that the relevant product categories, which mostly contain products of strategic interest, accounted for the 90% of the overall imports, it would be plausible to infer that the imports of Turkey from Israel concern mainly strategic products. In other words, the imports of Turkey from Israel concern strategic trade. As a result, strategic products served as the driving force for the overall imports. That is, any change in the evolution of the overall imports of Turkey from Israel was due to the imports of strategic products. The similarity of the trajectories of the trade flows of both the strategic products and the overall imports, as it appeared in ***Figure 4*** in the previous section, made this quite clear.

Therefore, the role of strategic products in the trade and foreign relations between Turkey and Israel is proved fundamental. As it has been mentioned in the literature review above, depending on the foreign policy concerns of states, the trade of strategic products can contribute to the establishment of strategic ties between states. Accordingly, between Turkey and Israel, the conduct of these transactions alone implies the preservation of strong trade bonds which in fact are strategic bonds. As a consequence, strategic products have contributed to the preservation of strategic bonds between Turkey and Israel during a period of turbulent relations. Nevertheless, this blooming trade has not yet contributed to, at least, a slight improvement of the Turkish-Israeli relations–even though, there have been such efforts in the recent past. However, it would not be an exaggeration to assume that a future, even slight, improvement of the bilateral relations would be possible. Besides, the literature offers arguments which uphold the above inferences and provide with broader explanations regarding the research results.

Two quite interesting perspectives towards an interpretation to the above inferences could be found in the literature. The first perspective comes from Turkish scholars who have highlighted the economic concerns of Turkish foreign policy as the cause of the ever-

blooming trade, while, the second perspective comes from Israeli scholars who have highlighted the security concerns of both Turkey and Israel as the cause of the preservation of strategic bonds. In particular, Turkish scholars, referring on Turkey's international trade relations of the last two decades, have attributed Turkey's emphasis on international trade to a shift in Turkey's foreign policy. This shift had led to the emergence of Turkey as a 'trading state'. In this context, Turkey's foreign policy placed the emphasis on the need to seek for foreign markets and to develop trade with them–especially exporting trade, primarily in Turkey's neighborhood. Of course, trade relations with Israel are included in this context, too. Even though the foreign policy of 'trading state' emerged mainly during the first years of JDP in power, it had been later undermined due to Turkish foreign policy choices and certain behavior (Kutlay, 2021, 2016; Barçin, 2015; Öniş & Kutlay, 2013; Kirisçi & Kaptanoğlu, 2011; Kirisçi, 2009); the relations with Israel have been an indicative example.

The 'trading state' foreign policy could partly account as an explanation of the dramatic increase of the imports of strategic products of Turkey from Israel. Though, the 'trading state' context is not sufficient enough to explain for the contradiction of this blooming imports with Turkey's foreign relations with Israel. To this, Israeli scholars referring on the relations of Turkey and Israel attributed this blooming trade to common security concerns that both countries share. According to this perspective, Turkey and Israel share not only common economic interests, but also common strategic interests. These common strategic interests primarily concern common perceptions of potential threats. In particular, Iran's divergent behaviour and terrorism are two top priority threats which concern both Turkey and Israel. Such common security concerns form the basis for the preservation of strategic bonds which are expressed through economic and civilian means. Therefore, bilateral trade has been increasing dramatically regardless of the turbulent climate of relations (Aviv, 2021; Bengio, 2009; Nachmani, 2003).

Taking the research results and all these arguments above into consideration, it could be inferred that the Turkish imports of strategic products from Israel which, as presented above, were increased dramatically during the years when in Turkey JDP was in power, served as an underlying basis of preserving strategic bonds between the two countries which were originated to common strategic and security concerns. In simple words, certain foreign policy concerns led both countries to maintain strategic ties which were expressed through strategic trade. Ultimately, at least in the Turkish-Israeli case, strategic products played a key role in maintaining underlying strategic bonds between Turkey and Israel during a period of turbulent relations. The next section summarizes the main points of this paper and concludes with suggestions regarding new questions for further research.

7. Conclusion

The relations of Turkey with Israel were downgraded over the last two decades from a strategic importance status during the 1990s to an almost hostile one. Taking into account that the bilateral relations reached a bottom level after a political change in Turkey in 2002, while at the same time trade between these two countries has not been affected at all by this deterioration of the bilateral relations, the paper addressed the question whether the latter turbulent Turkish-Israeli relations have affected the Turkish imports of strategic products from Israel. The research found out that the Turkish imports of strategic products from

Israel not only they have not been affected at all, but conversely, they were increased dramatically. Moreover, this dramatic increase took place during the years when in Turkey JDP was in power; that is, when the relations of Turkey and Israel were at a bottom level. Therefore, the research hypothesis which supported that the unfavorable climate of the bilateral relations would have a quite negative impact on the Turkish imports of strategic products from Israel cannot be confirmed by these findings. The paper discovered, in essence, that the content of the imports of Turkey from Israel concerns mainly strategic products. Consequently, the role of strategic products in the trade and foreign relations between Turkey and Israel is proved fundamental, as they constitute a decisive contribution to the preservation of strategic bonds between the two countries during a period of turbulent relations.

In other cases of similar troubled relations, such as the US-China and the Greek-Turkish relations mentioned earlier in literature review, trade does not always reduce conflict or conversely, conflict does not always reduce trade. In the US-China case, for instance, depending on the specific period of time and situation, the status of the foreign relations has both negative and positive impact on trade and vice versa (Su et al., 2020), while in the Greek-Turkish case, Greece has used trade as a leverage in order to deteriorate conflict with Turkey (Pantsios, 2007). Similarly, in the case of Ethiopia-Somalia relations, trade is found to produce more conflict, too (Reuveny & Kang, 1998). Furthermore, in the EU-Russia case, despite the tensions, energy is playing a leading role in their trade relations creating an environment of interdependence; however, this trade has been used for the exercise of geopolitical power, mostly by Russia (Siddi, 2018). On the contrary, in the cases of Egypt-Israel and Pakistan-India, which they are also indicative examples of troubled bilateral relations, the impact of foreign relations on trade or vice versa has been found to be very weak (Reuveny & Kang, 1998). All these examples, as well as the case study of this paper, show clearly that the extraction of universal assumptions regarding the foreign relations-trade interaction is subject to the specific characteristics of each case. Therefore, it seems that the separate study of each case could highlight more effectively the aspects of this interaction.

However, the present study also encountered some limitations. The vast number of commodities traded for a period of 25 years (more than 15 thousand products in total), as well as, the lack of a universal record system of strategic commodities did not allow for an exhausted recording of all the strategic products that Turkey imported from Israel, as such a process would require quite a long period of time and additional resources which were not available. Despite these limitations, the sample of the nine strategic products was proved more than enough to yield significant results regarding the paradox of the Turkish-Israeli trade and foreign relations interaction. Consequently, these results could contribute more broadly to knowledge regarding the role of strategic trade in international trade and foreign relations of states. Simultaneously, the research results raise new questions for further research. For instance, a question which comes first is what strategic products, if any, Israel has imported from Turkey. Another, quite interesting research would concern the overall imports of Turkey and the countries of origin during the same study period in order to gain a better understanding of Turkey's international trade behaviour. Furthermore, the same research question could concern the strategic trade and foreign relations interaction of other countries in the world, so as, to catch the view of the greater picture of the international strategic trade flows. In any case, the field remains fertile for further scientific research endeavors.

Acknowledgement:

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Appendix

Table A.1. Total trade between Turkey and Israel (M$), 1995-2019

Year	Turkish Imports from Israel	Israeli Imports from Turkey	Trade Balance	Total Trade
1995	209	286	77	495
1996	236	291	55	527
1997	267	426	159	693
1998	317	516	199	833
1999	368	649	281	1,017
2000	545	619	74	1,164
2001	565	837	272	1,402
2002	554	916	362	1,470
2003	463	1,120	657	1,583
2004	714	1,380	666	2,094
2005	805	1,430	625	2,235
2006	780	1,480	700	2,260
2007	980	1,690	710	2,670
2008	1,510	1,960	450	3,470
2009	1,210	1,530	320	2,740
2010	1,600	2,040	440	3,640
2011	2,100	2,360	260	4,460
2012	1,690	2,290	600	3,980
2013	2,500	2,600	100	5,100
2014	2,820	2,910	90	5,730
2015	1,940	2,670	730	4,610
2016	1,430	2,900	1,470	4,330
2017	1,420	3,340	1,920	4,760
2018	1,650	6,290	4,640	7,940
2019	1,500	4,430	2,930	5,930
Total	**28,173**	**46,960**	**18,787**	**75,133**

Source: Authors' own research (data gathered from OEC database).

Table A.2. Turkish Imports from Israel in Product Categories, 1995-2019

STRATEGIC PRODUCT CATEGORIES	M $	NON-STRATEGIC PRODUCT CATEGORIES	M $	
MINERAL PRODUCTS	8,730.00	TEXTILES	1.000.00	
CHEMICAL PRODUCTS	6,240.00	PAPER GOODS	618.00	
PLASTICS AND RUBBERS	3,520.00	VEGETABLE PRODUCTS	423.00	
MACHINES	3,450.00	PRECIOUS METALS	301.00	
METALS	1,960.00	STONE AND GLASS	176.00	
INSTRUMENTS	842.00	FOODSTUFFS	148.00	
TRANSPORTATION	448.00	MISCELLANEOUS	62.10	
WEAPONS	143.00	ANIMAL HIDES	42.40	
		ANIMAL PRODUCTS	33.90	
		ANIMAL AND VEGETABLE BI-PRODUCTS	11.50	
		FOOTWEAR AND HEADWEAR	5.40	
		WOOD PRODUCTS	2.80	
		ARTS AND ANTIQUES	2.62	
TOTAL	**25,333.00**		**2,826.72**	**28.159,72**
%	**89.96 %**		**10.04 %**	**100 %**

Source: Authors' own research (data gathered from OEC database).

Table A.3. Selected Strategic Products

Strategic Product	PRODUCT CATEGORY	HS92 ID
Refined Petroleum	MINERALS	2710
Propylene Polymers	PLASTICS AND RUBBERS	3902
Cyclic Hydrocarbons	CHEMICAL PRODUCTS	2902
Scrap Iron	METALS	7204
Gas Turbines	MACHINES	8411
Electric Generating Sets		8502
Aircrafts[15]	TRANSPORTATION	8802, 8803
LCDs	INSTRUMENTS	9013
Weapons[16]	WEAPONS	93, 871000

Source: Authors' own research

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[15] The Aircrafts product is consisted of two separate products, that of "Planes, Helicopters, Spacecrafts" (HS92 ID: 8802) and that of "Aircraft Parts" (HS92 ID: 8803).

[16] The product "Tanks and other Armored fighting vehicles" (HS92 ID: 871000), which originally belongs to the Transportation product category, was also included in the weapons product.

Table A.4. Strategic Products that Turkey imported from Israel ($), 1995-2019

	MINERALS	PLASTICS AND RUBBERS	CHEMICAL PRODUCTS	METALS	MACHINES		TRANSPORTATION	INSTRUMENTS	WEAPONS	
Year	Refined Petroleum	Propylene Polymers	Cyclic Hydrocarbons	Scrap Iron	Gas Turbines	Electric Generating Sets	Aircrafts	LCDs	Weapons	Total
1995	1,791,211	10,159,116	47,294,738		923,611		9,165,807	367,811	868,557	70,570,851
1996	1,195,134	6,128,568	16,840,000		432,927	78,000	7,250,867	852,778	5,958,855	38,737,129
1997	5,728,186	24,117,095	19,180,872	2,262,085	817,455	152,000	3,499,552	541,905	3,343,148	59,642,298
1998	388,159	26,348,033	21,362,859	2,437,768	678,952		583,518	1,878,254	3,914,010	57,591,553
1999	18,858,772	12,045,310	31,721,893	360,442	1,318,122	13,000	1,440,979	823,009	19,826,818	86,408,345
2000	26,787,766	23,145,736	44,133,614	157,489	127,051,040		1,575,829	468,139	4,234,011	227,553,624
2001	44,989,350	26,479,848	16,012,082	278,000	245,374,544		2,060,092	180,235	4,344,547	339,718,698
2002	53,497,500	19,626,806	19,322,338	318,587	53,913,163		72,429,005	90,179	22,323,318	241,520,896
2003	72,322,327	17,354,530	29,316,637	2,882,943	151,235		14,333,850	193,472	270,909	136,825,903
2004	127,714,150	17,987,691	81,719,260	44,191,094	967,862	4,996	610,257	118,590	434,183	273,748,083
2005	138,054,938	30,545,398	76,452,522	65,333,369	684,921		208,604	4,256,587	428,129	315,964,468
2006	111,755,400	24,696,970	41,942,647	65,129,220	946,458	512,223	2,780,562	315,109	318,130	248,396,719
2007	129,556,759	73,067,985	60,500,414	73,571,991	9,614,000	206,000	10,496,761	15,397,242	88,637	372,499,789
2008	225,967,029	230,487,966	48,609,364	118,588,995	7,485,964	3,656,000	12,592,810	21,730,224	8,674,136	677,792,488
2009	191,388,605	132,629,792	42,896,293	67,906,830	15,977,037	5,362,346	3,486,412	16,223,855	58,533,798	534,404,968
2010	343,495,090	138,156,586	78,781,852	172,317,560	592,150	140,000	89,575,789	14,346,039	1,566,000	838,971,066
2011	641,125,125	190,414,641	119,318,131	142,384,119	202,387	17,895,279	79,438,794	13,374,440	12,764,792	1,216,917,708
2012	416,160,809	140,653,766	166,839,536	117,737,465	288,866	40,469,184	14,531,327	18,873,029		915,553,982
2013	1,025,981,079	127,384,689	168,717,255	62,065,212	258,258	62,347,678	1,135,692	25,933,929	152	1,473,823,944
2014	1,821,248,411	117,450,098	67,189,700	72,947,114	2,211,800	74,925,776	512,140	25,223,891	60,509	2,181,769,439
2015	831,231,106	85,181,361	69,046,540	29,889,150	480,160	40,557,167	5,020,197	17,748,053	8,396	1,079,162,130
2016	466,724,182	76,584,116	75,841,399	28,804,309	20,545,576	29,353,534	2,496,423	29,133,147	2,042,140	731,524,826
2017	439,461,320	156,267,879	76,578,092	35,501,986	24,173,394	63,584,872	3,851,559	8,777,943	177,950	808,374,995
2018	604,763,228	141,754,049	113,553,404	72,391,281	11,008,874	90,157,414	2,208,674	4,423,184	15,731	1,040,275,839
2019	590,848,139	123,044,332	105,033,563	71,258,620	10,516,850	45,839,955	1,653,035	540,310		948,734,804
Total	**8,331,033,775**	**1,971,712,361**	**1,638,205,005**	**1,248,715,629**	**536,615,606**	**475,255,424**	**342,938,535**	**221,811,354**	**150,196,856**	**14,916,484,545**

Source: Authors' own research (data gathered from OEC database)

Table A.5. Correlation test among the strategic products Turkey imported from Israel, 1995-2019

		Refined Petroleum	Propylene Polymers	Cyclic Hydrocarbons	Scrap Iron	Gas Turbines	Electric Generating Sets	Aircrafts	LCDs	Weapons
Refined Petroleum	Pearson Correlation	1	.525**	.548**	.335	-.215	.756**	-.018	.659**	-.183
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.007	.005	.118	.303	.000	.932	.000	.404
	N	25	25	25	23	25	18	25	25	23
Propylene Polymers	Pearson Correlation	.525**	1	.597**	.761**	-.217	.401	.264	.660**	.138
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.007		.002	.000	.297	.099	.203	.000	.531
	N	25	25	25	23	25	18	25	25	23
Cyclic Hydrocarbons	Pearson Correlation	.548**	.597**	1	.587**	-.299	.583*	.081	.516**	-.229
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.005	.002		.003	.147	.011	.699	.008	.293
	N	25	25	25	23	25	18	25	25	23
Scrap Iron	Pearson Correlation	.335	.761**	.587**	1	-.378	-.056	.494*	.485*	.003
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.118	.000	.003		.076	.831	.017	.019	.991
	N	23	23	23	23	23	17	23	23	21
Gas Turbines	Pearson Correlation	-.215	-.217	-.299	-.378	1	.276	-.067	-.245	.029
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.303	.297	.147	.076		.267	.751	.238	.896
	N	25	25	25	23	25	18	25	25	23
Electric Generating Sets	Pearson Correlation	.756**	.401	.583*	-.056	.276	1	-.251	.302	-.299
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.099	.011	.831	.267		.315	.223	.260
	N	18	18	18	17	18	18	18	18	16
Aircrafts	Pearson Correlation	-.018	.264	.081	.494*	-.067	-.251	1	.057	.141
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.932	.203	.699	.017	.751	.315		.787	.520
	N	25	25	25	23	25	18	25	25	23
LCDs	Pearson Correlation	.659**	.660**	.516**	.485*	-.245	.302	.057	1	.039
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.008	.019	.238	.223	.787		.858
	N	25	25	25	23	25	18	25	25	23
Weapons	Pearson Correlation	-.183	.138	-.229	.003	.029	-.299	.141	.039	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.404	.531	.293	.991	.896	.260	.520	.858	
	N	23	23	23	21	23	16	23	23	23

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)

Source: Authors' own research (data gathered from OEC database).